Recent decades have seen an increased interest in the neuro scientific understanding of aggressive, criminal and anti social behaviours. [1] [2] [3] [4] Likewise, neuroscientific evidence has been increasingly introduced in criminal trials to explain criminal and mentally disordered behaviour. Four very re cent studies that were performed in Canada, England and Wales, the Netherlands and the United States demonstrate that introducing neurobiological explanations of criminal be haviour into courtrooms seems to be on the rise in different legal systems. [5] [6] [7] [8] It is therefore important to address how such evidence shapes criminal cases and legal decisions.
Why use neuroscience findings?
So far, in most documented cases, abnormal brain activity or morphology has been introduced by the defence as a miti gating factor in the sentencing phase of criminal trials. This happens typically in highstakes cases where defendants face a severe sentence, such as in death penalty cases in the United States. 9, 10 Evidence of abnormal brain activity is introduced as an indicator for reduced culpability of the defendant due to a mental disorder and thus follows a biological deterministic ar gument (in extreme cases, such evidence could be roughly summarized as, "his/her abnormal brain made him/her do it"). Important insights into how neuroscience affects court decisions in the United States were provided in a recent study by Denno 9 analyzing all criminal cases (800 in total) in which neuroscientific evidence played a role over the course of 2 dec ades (1992-2012). Denno concluded from the data that neuroscience evidence is mainly used for mitigation "accom panied by a complex range of defense strategies." Surpris ingly, she also found that many courts not only expect attor neys to stress neuroscience evidence, but also penalize attorneys who neglect this obligation. 9 In most legal systems, legal responsibility is determined on a behavioural level, with psychopathology being the crucial argument for reduced culpability. Neuroscience evidence can help to buttress these psychopathological arguments. Inter estingly, most of the cases with neuroscience evidence used clinically established techniques, such as structural imaging, positron emission tomography or electroencephalography (EEG), to demonstrate brain damage; 7 although this diag nosis seems to appear only in Canada, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder has also been used. 8 Nevertheless, in a small per centage of cases, more recent neuroscience techniques, such as fMRI or neurogenetics were introduced as well. 5, 7 It can be expected that the use of fMRI and neurogenetics will increase in criminal trials in the future, given the excitement sur rounding this research and its possible legal implications.
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To date, however, neuroscience findings typically report about group differences, and usually group differences from large samples cannot be applied to individual cases in crim inal trials.
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Attributing aggressive and criminal behaviours to genetics
A large number of studies on the genetic basis of aggressive and criminal behaviours have been conducted in the past few years. They found that approximately 50% of the variance in aggressive and antisocial behaviours is attributable to gen etics.
14 However, no specific polymorphism could be linked to aggression in a recent metaanalysis, 15 which indicates that a combination of a large number of variants (with a small effect size) is necessary to increase the risk for aggression. Probably the mostly studied gene in relation to antisocial and aggres sive behaviours is the gene coding for the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) enzyme. A point mutation in this gene leads to a complete deficiency of enzymatic activity that results in the socalled Brunner syndrome, a remarkable behavioural phe notype associated with dysregulated aggression and impul sivity. 1 However, not only complete deficiency of the MAOA enzyme affects behaviour. The 2002 study by Caspi and col leagues 2 found a gene × environment interaction, where carri ers of an MAOA lowactivity genotype who were maltreated during childhood had a significantly higher risk for adult antisocial behaviours. Male carriers of this genotype also have pronounced brain volume reductions in limbic structures and show altered brain functions. 16 Moreover, a recent study re ported a link between extremely violent behaviours (i.e., at least 10 committed homicides, attempted homicides or batter ies) and an MAOA lowactivity genotype in adults. 
Studying legal interpretations of neuroscience findings in the courtroom
It has been argued that introduction of such neuroscience findings into courtroom battles is a doubleedged sword. 17, 18 Either it mitigates a defendant's sentence because he/she is not held responsible for his/her biological makeup and thus legal responsibility and culpability might be reduced, or such evidence aggravates the sentence because the biological makeup will make the defendant commit further offenses in the future.
Recently (2012), Aspinwall and colleagues 18 conducted a study to investigate which blade of this doubleedged sword is sharper. They presented US state trial judges with a hypo thetical criminal case that was largely based on the case of Mobley v. The State, 19, 20 which was one of the most famous US criminal cases of the last decades because it was the first in which MAOA could have played a role. 21 The hypothetical case described a psychopath convicted of aggravated battery because he callously hit a store manager with a gun during a robbery attempt. Later, the psychopath bragged about his of fense to fellow detainees. After reading the vignette, partici pating judges were randomly assigned to 1 cell of a 2 × 2 de sign ("presenting party": defence v. prosecution and "biomechanism": present v. absent). All judges (n = 181) re ceived a psychiatric testimony about the defendant's psy chopathy, and only half received an additional neurobio logical explanation of psychopathy. The neurobiological explanation cited evidence about the lowactivity MAOA geno type and brain function and reported that the psychopath was tested for this genotype. Testimonies were presented either by the prosecution or by the defence. While the defence argued that the testimonies should mitigate the sentence, the prosecu tion argued for aggravation. Subsequently, judges had to pro vide answers and a sentence for the psychopath.
Aspinwall and colleagues 18 found that while the evidence concerning psychopathy was considered aggravating, the ad ditional neuroscience evidence reduced the sentence from 14 years to less than 13 years. Surprisingly, the judges did not rate the defendant as having less legal responsibility.
This study was the first to experimentally investigate the influence of neuroscience on the judicial system, and it was in line with other reallife reports that neuroscience evidence is used to mitigate the sentence of defendants in the United States 9, 22 and in other legal systems. 23, 24 Some colleagues and I were interested in whether the miti gating effect of neuroscience evidence is a general tendency in the Western world even though there are substantial differ ences among Western legal systems. We thus repeated the study by Aspinwall and colleagues 18 in the German legal sys tem and recruited 372 German judges to respond to a transla tion of the same vignette. 21 In the German legal system, pro found differences in responses occurred. First, the evidence concerning psychopathy was seen as mitigating overall. This was not surprising because in the German legal system psychi atric experts are usually appointed to assess whether a convict has diminished or no legal responsibility for an offense be cause of a mental disorder. Moreover, a neuroscience explana tion of psychopathy reduced judges' estimation of legal re sponsibility, yet the prison sentence was not affected in contrast to the US study. Most strikingly, we found that pre sentation of neuro science evidence by the prosecution signifi cantly increased the percentage of judges who ordered an in voluntary commitment in a forensic psychiatric hospital (23% v. 6%) instead of a prison sentence. Such a commitment may increase the detention time dramatically and possibly for the rest of the convict's life. 25 We argued that introduction of neuro science evidence emphasizes that a psychiatric disorder is a brain disorder and, thus, the need for (involuntary) treat ment seems to be considered greater. 21 Such a neurobiological basis may reduce the legal responsibility, but nevertheless in crease the likelihood for indeterminate involuntary commit ment, especially for those who have disorders with limited treatment options or poor prognosis (e.g., psychopathy or paraphilic disorders). The study by Aspinwall and colleagues 18 and our study 21 demonstrate how neuroscience evidence re ceives different responses in 2 legal systems. Although the evi dence was formally mitigating in both systems, it led to de creased detention time in the United States, whereas it possibly led to increased detention time in Germany.
The future will bring us a better understanding of the bio logical underpinnings of criminal and antisocial behaviours. Biological markers for violence and recidivism may help to improve the prediction of future offenses. A recent study found, for example, that low anterior cingulate activity dur ing performance of an inhibitory task was associated with much higher rates of rearrest among adult offenders within a time span of 4 years. 3 If such findings can be replicated, they might one day lead to neuroscience becoming a part of standardized risk assessments. This might ultimately im prove recidivism rates. Today, however, neuroscience is not at a stage where it could be considered predictive of future behaviours. No single polymorphism can be useful to foresee complex behaviours, such as aggression, as multiple genes with a small effect size seem to impact nondeterministically on brain function and thereby increase the risk for a certain behaviour only by a small degree. 31 Thus, it appears pre mature to put much weight on genetic or imaging explana tions for aggressive behaviour in criminal trials.
Neuroscientific understanding may open new avenues for the biological treatment of criminal and antisocial behav iours. For example, novel genome editing tools, such as clus tered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)Cas, might one day become available for site specific genomic modification of defective MAOA genes. 1, 26 Moreover, deep brain stimulation has been proposed as a means to selectively inhibit aggression 27 or sexual drive. 28 Such treatment options will bring up ethical issues (e.g., re garding informed consent) for treatment and punishment of offenders. 28, 29 They may also lead to psychopathologization of criminal behaviour that is currently not associated with men tal disorders. Thus, it appears very important to study how such treatments may affect sentencing in the future.
The study by Aspinwall and colleagues 18 and our study 21 investigated the influence of a specific construct (psycho pathy) and specific neurogenetic evidence on sentencing. We do not know if these findings can be translated to other dis orders (e.g., psychosis, other personality or paraphilic disor ders) or to other biological evidence (e.g., fMRI or quantitative EEG). Moreover, a recent study found that biological explana tions of mental disorders evoked less empathy than psycho social explanations in US clinicians. 30 Thus, psychiatric expert testimonies may also be affected by neuroscience evidence.
Conclusion
There are still many important research questions left un answered. Studying the intersection between neuroscience and the law is crucial not only to understand how concepts of legal responsibility and punishment are affected in different legal systems, but also to reflect the use of neuroscientific techniques for diagnosis, risk assessment and treatment. Researchers, clin icians and judges should be cautious not to be overinclusive on the behavioural implications of a biological finding that may well be incidental to rather than causal of a certain behaviour.
